Immovable property: where, why and how should it be taxed? A review of the literature and its implementation in Europe by Doris Prammer
Immovable property: 
where, why and how 
should it be taxed? A 
review of the literature and 




JEL: H21, H3, H71
https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.44.4.3
*  The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the OeNB or the Eurosystem. The author would like to thank two anonymous referees, Walpurga Koehler-
Toeglhofer, Lukas Reiss, Kilian Rieder and Martin Schneider for valuable suggestions and discussions.
**  Received: January 13, 2020
 Accepted: September 7, 2020
Doris PRAMMER










































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
484 Abstract
This paper surveys the literature on immovable property taxation along two 
dimensions prevalent in the literature: i) according to the type of real estate over 
its life-cycle and ii) according to the type of tax. The first strand of the literature 
agrees that immovable property taxation should be neutral to avoid distortionary 
behaviour vis-a-vis other assets/consumption goods. However, the neutrality 
benchmark and hence taxation to be chosen depend on the theoretical view taken. 
The second strand assesses one type of property tax at a single point in time with 
respect to the considerations of efficiency, equity, fiscal federalism and political 
economy. Most of this strand of the literature focuses on recurrent property taxa-
tion on residential property, which has a lot of theoretical merits. A key message 
of both strands is that reaping the theoretical merits of immovable property taxa-
tion in practice is hindered by tax design issues and political economy issues.
Keywords: immovable property taxation, recurrent property tax, owner-occupied 
housing
1 INTRODUCTION
Immovable property has been taxed since the Middle Ages (Almy, 2013), which 
explains its long tradition in public finance. Public finance economists have ana-
lysed the taxation of immovable property with respect to the considerations of 
efficiency, effectiveness, equality, budgetary and political economy. Recently, the 
analysis has been extended to assess its fit as a macroprudential policy tool to 
affect the housing market, given the role of the housing market in the wake of the 
economic and financial crisis (Kuttner and Shim, 2013; ESRB, 2015; Fatica, 
2015). Furthermore, international institutions such as the European Commission 
and the OECD seem to prefer immovable property taxation over other forms of 
taxation, as they keep requesting a tax shift from labour to immovable property 
taxation.1
The goal of this paper is to provide a non-technical overview of the most relevant 
aspects of immovable property taxation found in the literature and applied in 
Europe. The large amount of literature on the tax treatment of immovable property 
is classified along new dimensions. The paper innovatively reviews the literature 
on immovable property taxation along two lines: The first review category com-
prises literature that deals with the taxation of specific property items over their 
whole life-cycle, such as the taxation of owner-occupied housing. It highlights the 
distortions property taxation introduces to housing investment and consumption 
decisions compared to other assets/consumption goods. The second category con-
siders the literature that assesses the vices and virtues of one particular tax on 
immovable property (at one particular point in the life-cycle), such as recurrent 
1 The economic argumentation was laid down in Annex IV of the AGS 2012 (EC, 2011). Since then different 
member states have received the country specific recommendation to shift taxes away from labour to (recur-
rent) property taxation; e.g. AT in 2013 and 2014. The OECD recommends this shift in its country reports, 
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485property taxation. The paper hence gives a systematic overview of the literature 
on immovable property taxation according to either i) the type of real estate or ii) 
the type of tax, highlighting the most important findings in the two different 
strands of the literature. Moreover, it also describes some of the key features of 
housing taxation in the EU.
The focus of the survey on distortionary and efficiency considerations of immov-
able property taxation follows directly from the available literature. Other aspects 
such as equity, fiscal federalism and political economy considerations, while pre-
sent over a long time, have attracted less attention. Moreover, as empirical litera-
ture on housing taxation is scarce in Europe, empirical results throughout the 
paper also refer to the US, which serves as an indicator of the order of magnitude 
for Europe.
The paper is structured in three main parts. Section 2 serves as an introduction to 
the topic: it recalls all taxes that are possibly levied on immovable property and 
defines the terminology used in the remainder of the paper. Moreover, it also dis-
cusses briefly the current use and design of these taxes in EU member states. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 review the main economic arguments and empirical results in the 
literature: Following the two different strands identified, section 3 deals with the 
taxation according to the type of real estate over its life-cycle, while section 4 
provides an overview of the literature according to the specific type of immovable 
property tax. Section 5 concludes. A key message is that while literature attributes 
a lot of theoretical merits to immovable property taxation, practical tax design 
issues and considerations of political economy make it difficult to reap its merits 
in practice.
2 IMMOVABLE PROPERTY: WHEN/WHERE/HOW IS IT TAXED IN THE EU?
Before classifying the literature on immovable property taxation, a natural starting 
point is to recall where in its life-cycle immovable property is actually subject to 
which kind of tax. Graph 1 gives an overview of the most common immovable 
property taxes applied in the EU over the object’s life-cycle. It starts with taxes 
due at first purchase for an owner, ending with the object’s transfer to a new owner, 
when the object’s life-cycle – and tax liabilities – starts again. Taxes generally 
falling on stock variables are denoted by solid frames, while those on flow varia-
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486 Figure 1

























2.1 TAXES ON THE PURCHASE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
The purchase of immovable property is subject to a property transfer tax in almost 
all EU member states (exceptions EE, LT, SK). As indicated by the solid frame in 
Figure 1, this tax is usually based on a stock, namely the value of the property, 
typically measured by (some share of) the transaction price. Maximum statutory 
tax rates reach up to 12.5% of the transaction price,  as in Belgium (see Table 1), 
with various exemptions and deductions for first time buyers, permanent resi-
dences or small/inexpensive property. New buildings are subject to VAT based on 
the transaction price in most EU member states, which sometimes replaces the 
property transfer tax (Italy, Cyprus, Slovenia, Poland, Spain). In addition, all EU 
member states levy some kind of stamp duty linked to the legal recognition of the 
immovable property transfer and its registration. This stamp duty is either levied 
as a (low) percentage of the transaction price – in which case it presents a tax on 
a stock – and/or a fixed nominal amount. If the acquisition of immovable property 
is financed by a mortgage, the stamp duty is sometimes increased by a share of the 
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487Table 1
Tax rates on residential property in the euro area, in %
Maximum statutory tax  
rate on residential property Implicit tax rate




Belgium 12.5 16.5 0.690 
Germany 6.0 30.0 0.130 
Estonia no income  tax rate no
Ireland 2.0 30.0 0.180 
Greece 3.1 suspended 0.770 
Spain 10.0 23.0 0.340 
France 5.8 36.2 1.350 
Italy 9.0 20.0 0.410 
Cyprus 8.0 20.0 0.220 
Latvia 22.0 20.0 0.100 
Lithuania no income tax rate 15.0 0.080 
Luxembourg 10.5 income tax rate 0.070 
Malta 5.0 8.0 no
Netherlands 2.0 no 0.600 
Austria 3.5 30.0 0.030 
Portugal 8.0 29.0 0.360 
Slovenia 2.0 25.0 0.160 
Slovakia no income tax rate 0.160 
Finland 4.0 34.0 0.290 
* Main residences are gewnerally not subject to capital gains taxation.
Source: Own representation based on National Ministries of Finance; Barrios et al.(2019) and 
Fatica and Prammer (2018) for implicit tax rates.
2.2 TAXES DURING THE OWNERSHIP OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
The ownership of an immovable property is subject to recurrent property taxes.2 
The basic case of a recurrent tax on residential property is a flat rate which is lev-
ied on the cadastral value3 by local authorities. Some, particularly new, member 
states levy surface based local property taxes (Brzeski, Románová and Franzsen, 
2019). Only a few member states, namely Croatia4, Malta, Estonia and Italy5 do 
not levy recurrent property taxes. Despite their widespread use, the revenue from 
recurrent taxes on immovable property is rather low, amounting to only 1.6% of 
GDP in the EU on average in 2017 (EA-average: 1.3% of GDP). This is due to the 
use of the cadastral values as the tax base, which often fall short of up-to-date 
market values. Cadastral values in Germany and Austria are particularly outdated 
– stemming from the 1960s and 1970s, respectively.6 Hence, the effective 
2 For the economic discussion on recurrent property taxes, the reader is referred to section 4.1.
3 The cadastral value of a property refers to the value of the land and buildings as recorded in the land regis-
ter for tax purposes.
4 However, in Croatia a so-called ‘communal fee’ on properties based on its surface is levied.
5 Italy does not levy recurrent property taxes on the primary residence since 2017.
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488 recurrent property tax rate is well below 0.5% in the euro area (see Table 1 and 
Fatica and Prammer, 2018), despite the considerably higher statutory tax rates. An 
alternative to recurrently taxing the stock of immovable property is a tax on 
imputed rents. In this case a tax is levied on the fictive flow of rental income 
(dashed frame in Figure 1) – usually by adding it to other income categories; it is, 
however, currently only applied for main dwellings by the Netherlands.7
The case for a tax on the flow of rental income is clear cut, if the owner rents out 
the property and earns actual rental income. This income is subject to some kind 
of income taxation in all EU member states. VAT might be levied on the rent – for 
private rents often subject to a turnover threshold; generally private rents are sub-
ject to reduced VAT rates. If a private purchase of the immovable property is 
financed by a mortgage, mortgage interest rates are at least partially deductible in 
about 2/3 of the EU member states (Johannesson-Linden and Gayer, 2012; Fatica 
and Prammer, 2018).8
2.3  TAXES ON THE TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY TO A NEW 
OWNER
The sale of immovable property is generally subject to a capital gains tax, where 
the difference between the sale and the overall purchase price (often adjusted for 
CPI inflation after a holding period and/or costs for major improvements of the 
property) is taxed in almost all EU member states (see Table 1). At the same time, 
those member states that tax the profits allow for generous exemptions for a main 
residence. Usually, capital gains on a main residence are tax exempt subject to a 
minimum time of tenure (2-5 years) or provided that the capital gains are rein-
vested in the acquisition of a new main residence (e.g. Spain). If immovable prop-
erty is transferred charge-free in the case of an inheritance or gift, the transfer is 
subject to inheritance/gift tax in about half of the EU-member states9. Even if a 
state does not apply a general inheritance/gift tax, the cost-free transfer of immov-
able property might still be subject to taxation. In Austria, for example, a progres-
sive tax – depending on the family relationship and the value of the property – is 
levied upon the cost-free transfer of immovable property, while there is no general 
inheritance/gift tax.
Having set the scene, the remainder of the paper is dedicated to reviewing the lit-
erature on immovable property taxation either i) according to the type of real 
estate or ii) according to the type of tax. It presents the economic arguments for 
the taxation of immovable property and discusses them from considerations of 
efficiency, equity, fiscal federalism and political economy.
7 According to Johannesson-Linden and Gayer (2012) FN 6, BE, ES and IT tax imputed rents only for other 
than main dwellings. LU taxed imputed rents until 2016 based on the cadastral value; the NL use the market 
value of the property as the tax base. Additional information on the calculation of imputed rent taxation for 
other EU countries can be found in Figari et al.(2017).
8 The mortgage financing of business property is usually tax deductible in all member states.
9 Tax bases for real estate property when bequeathed are very heterogeneous in member states and tax rates 
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4893 TAXATION OF ONE TYPE OF REAL ESTATE OVER ITS LIVE-CYCLE 
Real estate property can be produced for rent in a market by a landlord, for own 
consumption and investment by an owner-occupier or for a business input. These 
different purposes of real estate property would call – according to optimal tax 
theory – for different taxation. According to optimal tax theory, production taxa-
tion should not distort factor proportions in production; hence, “to achieve pro-
duction efficiency, the tax on business income from housing should be made neu-
tral” (Englund, 2003:939).
3.1 TAXING OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING
Owner-occupied housing represents two features to its owners. First, housing usu-
ally presents the largest asset of a household, second living in a home provides a 
flow of services consumed by the owner. If the first view prevails, owner-occupied 
housing should be taxed as any other asset to achieve neutral taxation, while the 
second view would call for the taxation of owner-occupied housing like any other 
durable consumption good.
3.1.1 TAXING OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING AS AN ASSET
The household main residence presents on average almost 50% of total assets and 
more than 60% of total real assets in the euro area (HFCN, 2016). As it also pre-
sents the single largest asset in a household portfolio, literature tends to call for 
taxing it like any other asset under a Haig-Simons income tax scheme (e.g. Poterba 
and Sinai, 2008). This is to avoid distortions in the allocation of private invest-
ment and savings caused by the tax wedge on the return to different forms of 
capital (Berkovec and Fullerton, 1992; Gervais, 2002). For owner-occupied hous-
ing, following the user cost of capital approach, a Haig-Simons neutral income 
taxation translates into taxing the net return of owning a house, i.e. taxing the 
imputed rent (fictive rental income) as well as capital gains from selling the prop-
erty while allowing for the deduction of costs, such as maintenance costs and 
interest payments in the case of debt-financed purchase. In practice, as stated in 
section 2, the current treatment of housing taxation leaves imputed rents and cap-
ital gains for primary residences mostly untaxed while allowing for mortgage 
interest deductibility (MID). The effects of this beneficial fiscal treatment of 
owner-occupied housing have been studied empirically from various angles for 
the US employing the user cost of capital approach: While the academic literature 
has reached mixed conclusions on the impact of preferential taxation of owner-
occupied housing at the extensive margin – the “own vs. rent decision” (e.g. 
Rosen, 1979; Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Gervais, 2002; Hanson, 2012), it generally 
agrees that tax preferential treatment incentivises excess consumption of housing-
services by home-owners at the intensive margin, i.e. with respect to housing size 
(e.g. Rosen 1985; Poterba, 1984; 1992, Hanson, 2012). Based on the user cost of 
capital approach, costs for public finances compared to the neutral benchmark 
have been found to range from 2.1 to 2.6 percent of overall tax revenues (e.g. 
Poterba and Sinai, 2008; Martin and Hanson, 2016) in the US. Given the generous 
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490 strongly regressive distributional impact of the tax breaks for owner occupied 
housing (e.g. Poterba, 1992; Poterba and Sinai, 2011; Martin and Hanson, 2016). 
For the euro area, the few studies10 employing (variants of) the user cost of capital 
approach generally confirm the empirical findings for the US. For example, Fatica 
and Prammer (2018) show that the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing reduces the user cost of housing capital by almost 40 percent compared 
to the efficient level under neutral taxation. The tax benefits stem mostly from the 
under-taxation of equity, namely the widespread tax exemption of imputed rents 
and capital gains. They find that these tax benefits translate into an excess con-
sumption of housing services equivalent to about 30 percent of financial asset 
holdings in household portfolios. Moreover, given the regressivity of the tax pref-
erential treatment of owner-occupied housing in most euro area  states, equity 
could be increased by the removal of these tax breaks (e.g. Matsaganis and 
Flevotomou, 2007; Figari et al., 2017; Fatica and Prammer, 2018).
3.1.2 TAXING OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING AS A CONSUMPTION GOOD
If (owner-occupied) housing is treated as a (very) durable consumption good, then 
it should be subject to VAT. Hence it should be subject to (standard) VAT when 
new, as the price of the good - when new - should correspond to the present value 
of the stream of future services it provides (Mirrlees et al., 2011). Indeed, new 
buildings are subject to VAT in most EU member states. However, the upfront 
acquisition price might be a bad proxy for the stream of services for very long-
lived products such as housing. Hence, as indicated by the Mirrlees Review (Mir-
rlees et al., 2011) an annual tax related to the consumption value of the property is 
a more effective way of taxing housing. It accounts for changes in the value of 
housing services and can be applied to the existing housing stock.11 Practically, 
recurrent property taxes or imputed rent taxation, adequately reflecting the (con-
sumption) value of the property, would do the job efficiently.
Drawing on optimal tax theory literature, it can be said that on one hand the low 
price elasticity of housing would call for high taxation while on the other hand its 
low income elasticity – being a necessary good – suggests lower taxation (com-
pare Englund, 2003; Albouy and Findeisen, 2016). Nevertheless, Albouy and 
Findeisen (2016) state that it is more efficient to tax housing higher than any other 
forms of consumption with tax rates being at least 50 percent higher than on other 
forms of consumption. According to them, two arguments, namely that housing is 
a substitute for taxable, market-oriented activities and that the value of housing 
stems from the land it is on – which presents an in inelastic base – both call for 
high taxation of housing consumption. These factors empirically outweigh the 
arguments that housing deserves lower taxation because it is a necessity or because 
it might distort location choices impacting negatively on productivity.
10 For the EU and euro area, empirical studies employing the user-cost approach are scarce mostly due to 
data limitations.
11 This is particularly important when the transition to a VAT for new housing would introduce considerable 
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4913.2 TAXING RENTAL HOUSING
Rental housing presents a pure consumption good for the tenant and an investment 
good for the landlord. A tax system guaranteeing production efficiency in the pro-
vision of housing services should be made neutral (Englund, 2002). Hence, net 
profits should be taxed as business income, and capital gains tax should be levied 
when selling the property. Landlords generally include rents received as income 
and deduct expenses, such as maintenance and operating costs (both labour and 
capital costs), mortgage interest, and some depreciation costs. The resulting net 
profit should be subject to corporate income tax or personal income tax depending 
on the legal status of the landlord. Practical complications might, however, arise 
due to preferential tax treatment of debt and of double taxation issues of profits 
and dividends (Englund, 2002). From a consumer’s point of view, taxation should 
not distort tenure decisions between owning and renting a house. While conven-
tional literature points to the tax preferential treatment of owner-occupied housing 
(compare section 3.1) compared to rental income, Chambers, Garriga and Schla-
genhauf (2009) suggest that the progressivity of income taxation can amplify or 
mitigate these tax asymmetries, with important implications for tenure choices.
3.3 TAXING IMMOVABLE/REAL ESTATE BUSINESS PROPERTY
While it is generally agreed that residential and business real estate property should 
be taxed differently, the literature on business property taxation does generally not 
follow the overall life-cycle of the business property. The bulk of the literature is 
restricted to the effect of recurrent property taxation and assesses it with respect to 
its implications for business competitiveness (compare section 4.1).
In general, the assessment on how (recurrent) business property taxation should 
be designed depends on whether one takes the “capital tax view” or the “benefit 
tax view”.12 The first view considers real estate property as an input factor for the 
business and calls for taxation in line with other input factors to avoid a misalloca-
tion of input factors. As in this view business property taxation falls on capital, 
thus disincentivizing investment and creating location distortions, the Mirrlees 
Review (Mirrlees et al., 2011) advocates non taxation of business property on 
efficiency grounds. Contrastingly, according to the “benefit tax view” the tax falls 
on land value (and benefits linked to it) making it an efficient means for raising 
revenues (Smart, 2013). Moreover, Blöchliger (2015) stresses the efficiency of 
business property taxes as an important backstop to incorporation in order to 
avoid the residential property tax. Empirically, businesses seem to react little to 
business property taxes, which supports the “benefit tax view” (Smart, 2013). 
Norregaard (2013) is among the few to highlight the distortive effects of transfer 
taxes on businesses, as these taxes impose efficiency costs through resource mis-
allocations to the extent their incidence rests on business inputs.
12 See Smart (2013) for a review of the literature, including the different arguments put forward depending on 
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492 4  TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE AT A SPECIFIC POINT IN TIME – SPECIFIC 
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY TAXES
Most of the literature on immovable property taxation focuses on one specific type 
of tax and assesses its vices and virtues with respect to i) efficiency and effective-
ness, ii) fairness/equity, iii) fiscal federalism and iv) political economy. Recurrent 
property tax on residential property has been in the focus of the literature, while 
property transfer taxes have gained more attention recently. VAT and inheritance/
gift taxation are hardly assessed with a special focus on immovable property and 
hence are not included in this overview.13
4.1 RECURRENT PROPERTY TAXES
The long-standing tradition of property taxes – modern European property taxes 
date back to the Middle Ages (Almy, 2013) – lies in their transparency, relative 
ease of administration, their suitability as a stable revenue source for sub-central 
governments and their economic efficiency. International organisations such as 
the EU and the OECD keep requesting that taxes be shifted from distortionary 
labour taxation to property taxation; the grounds alleged are those of efficiency 
and equity.14 Indeed, recurrent property taxes are usually found to be among the 
least detrimental taxes for economic growth (Arnold, 2008), while at the same 
time they respect equity objectives (Cournède, Goujard and Pina, 2013). This is 
particularly true for pure land taxes, as land is immobile, and its taxation is on a 
truly immobile base and hence does not affect decisions to work, save and invest. 
However, a joint tax on land and the building on it, as applied by most EU member 
states (Almy, 2013), might impact on investment decisions. Both homeowners 
and businesses might be discouraged from investing if (improvement) investment 
results in a higher property tax liability.15
However, in most member states property taxes are not levied on recent up-to date 
market values but on outdated cadastral values (compare section 2; Almy, 2013; 
Johannesson-Linden and Gayer, 2012; Blöchliger, 2015) and are sometimes area-
based. The non-reflection of property values limits the risk of under-investment 
and moreover stabilizes property tax revenues for member states. Nevertheless, 
this very feature of the property tax design has been heavily criticised. First, mar-
ket developments are not reflected and the tax cannot therefore contribute much to 
dampening the boom-and-bust-cycle of property markets and is thereby limited in 
13 Given the lack of literature and the heterogenous treatment of real estate property when bequeathed, an 
assessment of its economic (and empirical) impacts is left for further research.
14 There is also literature assessing the impact of recurrent property taxation on urban sprawl, generally estab-
lishing a negative link between recurrent property taxes and urban sprawl (Brueckner and Kim, 2002; Song 
and Zenou, 2006; Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010). However, housing tax benefits such as mortgage interest deduct-
ibility (MID) seem to increase urban sprawl both in the US (Voith, 1999; Glaeser, 2011) and in Europe (for 
Belgium see: Xhignesse and Verbist, 2019). Nevertheless, MID can increase efficiency in location decisions 
as it mitigates the tax penalty of working in an area with better-paying jobs and higher house prices (Albouy 
and Hansen, 2014).
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493reducing the fluctuations in the economy.16 Second, the tax is not perceived as fair. 
Those made relatively wealthier by the market or enjoying more neighbourhood 
amenities (which should be capitalized into house prices) compared to the time 
when the cadastral value was set, pay the same property tax as those with stagnant 
property values. Moreover, the relevant literature (e.g. Wassmer, Fisher and Kulo-
szewski, 2019) claims that the public does not perceive recurrent property tax as 
progressive. However, as indicated by empirical literature “property tax can 
indeed be anything from progressive to regressive” (Blöchliger, 2015:15). While 
this conclusion rests on the exact design of the recurrent property tax applied in 
practice, it also hinges upon different beliefs about the incidence of property taxa-
tion. Theoretically, if property taxes are considered as a real estate tax on capital 
income (“capital-tax view” or “new view”), it is a progressive tax, as housing 
capital is generally concentrated among high income individuals. However, if it is 
seen as a tax on housing consumption services, it is considered regressive as the 
share of housing consumption expenditure in income is higher for low income 
households (“old-view”). The third view (“benefit view”) considers recurrent 
property taxes as neither regressive nor progressive, as the tax represents a fee/
price for local goods and services.17 Furthermore, recurrent property taxation does 
not generally follow the ability-to-pay principle, which is usually considered to 
constitute a fair tax. A tax on the property value is not linked to current income, 
which makes it particularly burdensome for income-poor-housing-rich house-
holds such as senior households.
Given the practical shortcomings of the recurrent property tax, economists have 
repeatedly issued reform suggestions, to reap the full theoretical benefits of a recur-
rent property tax. Among the most frequently expressed reform necessities is the 
need to update the tax base to market values to increase the fairness of the tax (Nor-
regaard, 2013; Slack and Bird, 2014; Blöchliger, 2015). The issue of equity/distri-
butional reservations could be handled with an increase in the progressivity of the 
tax design e.g. by exemptions or property tax credits (based on income) for low 
income households or progressive tax rates. Tax deferrals for retirees would 
strengthen the ability to pay principle for senior households (Slack and Bird, 2015). 
A more radical approach has been put forward by work by the OECD18 suggesting 
taxing immovable property through the income tax system, via the taxation of 
imputed rents jointly with income from other sources (compare section 4.3).
While reform proposals are manifold, actual recurrent property tax reforms remain 
limited in number and size. This might be due to two factors: i) fiscal federalism 
frameworks and ii) political economy considerations. As a recurrent (residential) 
property tax fulfils the basic requirements for a good local tax (Oates and Schwab, 
16 Poghosyan (2016) has found a limited dampening effect of recurrent property taxes in the US, where recur-
rent property taxes are levied on property market values. Oliviero et al.(2019) find a strong negative relation-
ship between increases in immovable property tax revenues and house prices for a panel of OECD countries. 
17 For details on different views on the incidence of property taxation see e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), 
Smart (2013), Norregaard (2013) and Oates and Fischel (2016).
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494 2004; Bird, 2011; Bird, Slack and Tassonyi, 2012) such as immobility, predictabil-
ity, stability, visibility, ease of administration and non-exportability to other juris-
dictions (see Table 2), it is usually devolved to sub-central governments. Hence, 
any changes of the property tax design impact on the sub-central tax mix resulting 
in the need to change inter-governmental transfer schemes as well or even the 
whole intergovernmental framework (Blöchliger, 2015; Norregaard, 2013). 
Another obstacle to property tax reforms seems to be the high transparency of the 
tax, which has made it “politically very unpopular” (Norregaard, 2013:33). Even 
if a properly designed reform alleviated some of the political economy reserva-
tions such as perceived regressivity and unfairness due to outdated market values 
or issues for liquidity-constrained households, the property tax remains a pre-
sumptive tax, based on estimated (market) values. As property tax is capitalized 
into property prices, any reform would generate winners and losers, where gener-
ally losers are more vocal, resulting in “tax revolts” (Blöchliger, 2015). Hence, 
Slack and Bird (2014) explain the limited appetite for property tax reforms by 
political considerations outweighing economic principles as stability is favoured 
over equity and efficiency.
Table 2
Properties of a good local tax










Immobile tax base Yes Yes Yes
Predictable and stable 
revenues Yes Yes No
No tax exporting Yes No Yes
Visible and accountable Yes No Yes
Fair based on benefits 
received Yes No ?
Fair based on ability to pay Yes ? Yes
Easy to administer Yes No Yes
Source: Bird (2011); Bird, Slack and Tassonyi (2012); own representation for property transfer tax.
4.2 PROPERTY TRANSFER TAXES
Even though property transfer taxes have also a long tradition (Lenoel, Matsu and 
Naisbitt, 2018) and tax rates can be as high as VAT rates in some countries (see 
Table 1), they have been heavily criticized on efficiency grounds. Norregaard 
(2013) and the Mirrlees et al. (2011) point out that transaction taxes discourage 
transactions and hence might distort the allocation of resources and hence lead to 
significant welfare losses.19 Indeed, empirical analysis shows that higher property 
transfer taxes not only decrease transactions but also lower house prices and house 
price growth respectively (e.g. Davidoff and Leigh, 2013; Fritzsche and Vandrei, 
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4952016; Berger, Turner and Zwick, 2017; Best and Kleven, 2018; Koetter, Marek 
and Mavropoulos, 2019). Effects seem to be stronger in rural regions than in urban 
areas (Koetter, Marek and Mavropoulos, 2019). Moreover, property transfer taxes 
might add imperfections to the labour market via the lock-in effect of workers. If 
transaction costs are high, owners are encouraged to remain in the size and loca-
tion of their home, irrespective of efficiency gains by moving towards areas of 
excess labour demand. Several empirical studies (e.g. Van Ommeren and van Leu-
vensteijn, 2005; Hilber and Lyytikainen, 2017) confirm that higher transfer costs 
have a negative impact on labour mobility and are even linked to higher unem-
ployment risk (De Graaf and van Leuvensteijn, 2013). Eerola et al. (2019) show 
that the negative impact of housing transfer taxes on household mobility is even 
higher when taking spillover effects between different housing market segments 
into account, which is generally ignored in previous studies.
However, efficiency can also be assessed from a macroprudential point of view, 
assessing the ability of property transfer taxes to curb house price increases and 
house price volatility. In addition to curbing house price growth, property transfer 
taxes also decrease house price volatility (Catte et al., 2004; Kuttner and Shim, 
2013) – in particular if they are especially designed to prevent speculation (Hua 
and Craig, 2011). However, as effects seem to be small or even ambiguous, other 
macroprudential tools might be more effective in reducing house price swings that 
might ultimately stress the banking sector and the economy.
According to the fiscal federalism view, property transfer taxes could be perceived 
as a good local tax. They fulfil the same requirements as recurrent property taxes 
except that they are a bit less predictable and the revenues are a bit more volatile 
(compare Table 2). They are levied on an immobile base with high visibility and 
accountability and usually fairly based on the ability to pay. As property transfer 
taxes are usually levied on an ad valorem basis on the property transaction price, 
they are generally quite equitable. Presumably, wealthier and higher income per-
centiles opt for higher value houses subject to higher taxation, which makes the 
property transfer tax mildly progressive even in the case of flat tax rates. Clearly, 
depending on the exact design of the property transfer tax, it can be anything from 
regressive to strongly progressive. For example, the UK stamp duty is levied at 
higher rates on higher value houses – where the respective rate is applied to the 
whole purchase price. However, these kinks in the tax design might provide con-
siderable incentives for undervaluing the property to evade taxes. The incentive 
for collusion between buyer and seller to evade taxes is another issue in case of 
high transaction costs (Norregaard, 2013).
While the justification for property transfer taxes could be found in fiscal federal-
ism, equity considerations and macroprudential effectiveness, Mirrlees et al. 
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496 grounds.20 However, as Mirrlees et al. (2011) stresses, outright abolition would 
lead to windfall gains for existing owners, as property transaction costs have been 
capitalized into property values.
4.3 CAPITAL GAINS TAXES AND THE TAXATION OF IMPUTED RENTS
4.3.1 CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
Like property transfer taxes, capital gains taxes on immovable property are levied 
at the time of the transfer of the property – albeit at the end of its life-cycle with 
respect to the current owner. Literature21 seems to conclude that capital gains taxes 
– like property transfer taxes – can lead to lock-in effects with fewer transactions 
and less labour mobility as well as distortions in the housing market with respect 
to tenure and housing size choices. In line with property transfer taxes, capital 
gains taxes tend to reduce house price volatility and might hence be put to use for 
macroprudential policy objectives.
As capital gains taxes are levied on a flow, namely income resulting from the 
appreciation of the housing value, they are usually said to be more efficient taxes 
than property transfer taxes, which are levied on a stock. According to the Mir-
rlees et al. (2011) taxes on an income flow are also perceived as fairer than taxes 
on a stock of wealth. Capital gains taxes also follow the ability to pay principle as 
those with higher capital gains are subject to higher taxation. However, if the 
appreciation of the property value is due to general inflation or due to maintenance 
and improvement efforts, the taxation of overall capital gains might be perceived 
as unfair and discourage investment into housing (Bourassa and Grigsby, 2000). 
In practice, however, the advantages and disadvantages for housing markets stem-
ming from capital taxation are not very pronounced, as most member states do not 
levy taxes on capital gains on primary residences/or owner-occupied housing in 
general. This favourable tax treatment of housing taxation compared to other 
(capital) investment might deter investment decisions (compare section 3.1).
4.3.2 IMPUTED RENT TAXATION
As mentioned in 3.1.1 a Haig-Simons neutral tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing would call for the taxation of imputed rents, as including them as income 
better represents the household’s consumption opportunities. The failure to do so 
distorts resource allocation by incentivizing over-investment in housing compared 
to productive investment and reduces portfolio diversification (Fatica and Pram-
mer, 2018). These capital market distortions are ultimately detrimental to eco-
nomic growth (Figari et al., 2017). Focusing on the distributional impact of the 
non-taxation of imputed rents, Figari et al. (2017) show in a microsimulation 
analysis that including net imputed rents in the tax base of personal income not 
only equalises consumption opportunities between renters and homeowners but 
20 In the Mirrlees Review (2011) the argument for abolition also seems to be due to the specific design of the 
UK property transfer tax (stamp duty).
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497also reduces inequality. In their sample of EU countries, higher income families 
generally hold more expensive properties – translating into higher imputed rents 
– which are subject to higher marginal tax rates in the progressive personal income 
tax systems analysed.
This is in line with earlier empirical literature for the EU (Frick and Grabka, 2003; 
Frick, Goebel and Grabka, 2007; Frick et al., 2010). However, as Saarimaa (2011) 
and also Figari et al. (2017) point out, the effect seems to be small, and it hinges 
crucially on how the additional tax revenues are returned to the economy.
Moreover, the concept of imputed rent taxation suffers from severe issues (Bou-
rassa and Grigsby, 2000): imputed rents are not measurable22 but remain presump-
tive, which impacts on their perceived fairness and make them administratively 
very cumbersome. Moreover, they can be perceived as a tax on wealth with detri-
mental effects on investment decisions.
Nevertheless, several authors (e.g. Gayer and Mourre, 2012; Blöchliger, 2015) 
consider imputed rent taxation via the income tax system a substitute for recurrent 
property taxation. However, there are several important differences, Firstly, 
imputed rent taxation via the personal income tax system might increase the dis-
tortions in the labour market.23 If taxed at capital tax rates, this might distort 
households’ incentives to shift between labour and capital income (Blöchliger, 
2015). Secondly, imputed rent taxation is most likely less transparent than recur-
rent property taxes as it is levied at source with income. Finally, imputed rent 
taxation has a stronger link to the ability to pay principle, which might increase its 
perceived fairness. However, a change from recurrent property taxation – usually 
accruing to sub-central governments – to imputed rent taxation – income taxation 
is usually levied by central governments -– is particularly difficult in federalist 
countries as it changes intergovernmental fiscal relations considerably (Blöch-
liger, 2015).
5 CONCLUSIONS
The ample literature on immovable property taxation can be grouped into two 
strands. The first covers the taxation of one type of real estate over its life-cycle, 
such as owner-occupied housing. It highlights the distortions property taxation 
introduces into housing investment and consumption decisions compared to other 
assets/consumption goods. The second strand assesses the merits and demerits of 
one particular tax on immovable property at a specific point in time, such as recur-
rent property taxation. The literature assesses the taxes with respect to induced 
distortions and their effectiveness and efficiency for economic growth, equity and 
fairness, fiscal federalism considerations and political economy obstacles.
22 Statistical offices estimate imputed rents on an aggregate level to be included in macroeconomic aggregates 
such as private consumption expenditure or GDP following ESA conventions.
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498 While grouping the literature along these lines is relatively easy, it is more diffi-
cult to summarize the findings. The first strand of the literature agrees that immov-
able property taxation should be neutral to avoid distortionary behaviour. How-
ever, the neutrality benchmark to be chosen depends on the theoretical view taken. 
Immovable property could be taxed as an investment – for private or business use 
– or as a consumption good, which determines the benchmark and possible distor-
tions. However, as noted by Lenoel, Matsu and Naisbitt (2018:41), “most taxes 
are distortionary, and whether the distortions affecting housing are larger or less 
desirable than in other markets is still an unresolved issue.”
The second strand assesses one type of tax at a time with respect to its vices and 
virtues. The focus is usually on efficiency considerations of immovable property 
taxation while other aspects such as equity, fiscal federalism and political econ-
omy considerations, have gained less attention. Given the trade-offs between 
these aspects, the relevant literature does not seem to allow for a general “best 
immovable property tax” ranking24, since the overall effect of a tax ultimately 
depends on its exact design. Moreover, as indicated in the first strand of the litera-
ture, the overall effect of immovable property taxation also needs to be assessed 
over the object’s life-cycle.
However, literature in both strands seems to conclude that property taxation on 
residential property has a lot of theoretical merits, but that its practical application 
departs significantly from the theoretical best practice (Slack and Bird, 2014; 
2015). Hence, the relevant literature asks for practice to be brought closer to the-
ory. At the same time political economy issues that might act as obstacles to 
reform should be carefully overcome.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
24 Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013) rank different consolidation strategies (increases in particular taxes and 
cuts in specific spending areas) according to their efficiency and equity trade-offs. A consolidation strategy 
based on recurrent property tax increases ranks comparatively high; consolidation strategies based on other 








































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
499REFERENCES
1. Albouy, D. and Findeisen, S., 2016. Should We Be Taxed Out of Our Homes? 
The Optimal Taxation of Housing Consumption. Proceedings. Annual Con-
ference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax 
Association, 109, pp. 1-24.
2. Albouy, D. and Hanson, A., 2014. Are houses too big or in the wrong place? 
Tax benefits to housing and inefficiencies in location and consumption. Tax 
policy and the economy, 28(1), pp. 63-96. https://doi.org/10.1086/675588
3. Almy, R., 2013. Property tax regimes in Europe. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. 
4. Andrews, D., Sánchez, A. C. and Johansson, Å., 2011. Housing markets and 
structural policies in OECD countries. OECD Working Paper, No. 836. https://
doi.org/10.1787/5kgk8t2k9vf3-en
5. Arnold, J., 2008. Do tax structures affect aggregate economic growth? Empir-
ical evidence from a panel of OECD countries. OECD Working Paper, No. 
643. https://doi.org/10.1787/236001777843
6. Banzhaf, S. and Lavery, N., 2010. Can the Land Tax Help Curb Urban Sprawl? 
Evidence from Growth Patterns in Pennsylvania. Journal of Urban Econom-
ics, 67(2), pp. 169–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2009.08.005
7. Berger, D., Turner, N. and Zwick, E., 2017. Stimulating housing markets. 
NBER Working Paper, No. 22903. 
8. Berkovec, J. and Fullerton, D., 1992. A general equilibrium model of housing, 
taxes and portfolio choice. Journal of Political Economy, 100, pp. 390–429. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/261822
9. Best, M. C. and Kleven, H. J., 2018. Housing Market Responses to Transac-
tion Taxes: Evidence from Notches and Stimulus in the U.K. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 85(1), pp. 157–193. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx032
10. Bird, R. M., 2011. Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries: A Review 
of the Literature. Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy, 
2(1), pp. 139–161. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793993311000269
11. Bird, R. M., Slack, N. E. and Tassonyi, A., 2012. A Tale of Two Taxes: Prop-
erty Tax Reform in Ontario. Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
12. Blöchliger, H., 2015. Reforming the Tax on Immovable Property. OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 1205. https://doi.org/10.1787/5js30tw0n7kg-en
13. Bourassa, S. C. and Grigsby, W. G., 2000. Income tax concessions for owner-
occupied housing. Housing Policy Debate, 11(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/105
11482.2000.9521377
14. Brueckner, J. K. and Kim, H., 2003. Urban Sprawl and the Property Tax. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 10, pp. 5–23.
15. Brzeski, J., Románová, A. and Franzsen, R., 2019. The evolution of property 
taxes in post-Socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. ATI Working 
Paper, WP/19/01.
16. Buettner, T., 2017. Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer Tax. CESifo Work-








































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
500 17. Catte, P. [et al.], 2004. Housing Markets, Wealth and the Business Cycle. 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 394. https://doi.
org/10.1787/534328100627
18. Chambers, M., Garriga, C. and Schlagenhauf, D. E., 2009. Housing policy 
and the progressivity of income taxation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 
56(8), pp. 1116–1134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.10.007
19. Cournède, B., Goujard, A. and Pina, Á., 2013. How to achieve growth-and 
equity-friendly fiscal consolidation? A proposed methodology for instrument 
choice with an illustrative application to OECD countries. OECD Journal: 
Economic Studies, 13(1). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650018
20. Davidoff, I. and Leigh, A., 2013. How do stamp duties affect the housing 
market? Economic record, 89(286), pp. 396–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-
4932.12056
21. De Graaff, T. and van Leuvensteijn, M., 2013. A European Cross-Country 
Comparison of the Impact of Homeownership and Transaction Costs on Job 
Tenure. Regional Studies, 47(9), pp. 1443–1461. https://doi.org/10.1080/0034
3404.2011.626761
22. Eerola, E. [et al.], 2019. Effects of housing transfer taxes on household mobil-
ity. CESifo Working Paper, No. 7750.
23. Englund, P., 2003. Taxing residential housing capital. Urban Studies, 40(5-6), 
pp. 937–952. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098032000074254
24. ESRB, 2015. Report on Residential Real Estate and Financial Stability in the 
EU. Frankfurt am Main: European Systemic Risk Board. 
25. European Commission, 2011. Growth-friendly tax policies in Member States 
and better tax coordination in the EU. Annual growth survey 2012 annex IV. 
COM (2011) 815 final Annex IV, 23 November 2011. Bruxelles: European 
Commission.
26. Fatica, S. and Prammer, D., 2018. Housing and the tax system: how large are 
the distortions in the euro area? Fiscal Studies, 39(2), pp. 299–342. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1475-5890.12159
27. Fatica, S., 2015. Housing taxation: from micro design to macro impact. Quar-
terly Report on the Euro Area, 14(1), pp. 27–33. 
28. Figari, F. [et al.], 2017. Removing homeownership bias in taxation: The distri-
butional effects of including net imputed rent in taxable income. Fiscal Stud-
ies, 38(4), pp. 525–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12105
29. Frick, J. R. [et al.], 2010. Distributional effects of imputed rents in five Euro-
pean countries. Journal of Housing Economics, 19, pp. 167–179. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jhe.2010.06.002
30. Frick, J. R. and Grabka, M. M., 2003. Imputed rent and income inequality: a 
decomposition analysis for the UK, West Germany and the USA. Review of 









































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
50131. Frick, J. R., Goebel, J. and Grabka, M. M., 2007. Assessing the distributional 
impact of “imputed rent” and “non-cash employee income” in micro data: 
case study based on EU-SILC (2004) and SOEP (2002). SOEP Paper 2. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1089363
32. Frithsche, C. and Vandrei, L., 2016. The German Real Estate Transfer Tax: 
Evidence for Single-Family Home Transactions. ifo Working Paper, No. 232. 
https://doi.org/10.15396/eres2017_97
33. Fullerton, D. and Metcalf, G. E., 2002. Tax incidence. Handbook of public 
economics, 4, pp. 1787–1872. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4420(02)80005-2
34. Gayer, C. and Mourre, G., 2012. Property taxation and enhanced tax adminis-
tration in challenging times. Economic Papers, No. 463.
35. Gervais, M., 2002. Housing taxation and capital accumulation. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 49, pp. 1461–1489. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-
3932(02)00172-1
36. Glaeser, E. L., 2011. Rethinking the Federal Bias Toward Homeownership. 
Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 13(2), pp. 5–37
37. Hanson, A., 2012. Size of Home, Home Ownership, and the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction. Journal of Housing Economics, 21(3), pp. 195–210. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jhe.2012.06.001
38. HFCN, 2016. The Household Finance and Consumption Survey: results from 
the second wave. ECB Statistics Paper, No. 18. 
39. Hilber, C. A. L. and Lyytikäinen, T., 2017. Transfer taxes and household 
mobility: Distortion on the housing or labor market? Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics, 101, pp. 57–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2017.06.002
40. Hua, C. and Craig, R. S., 2011. Determinants of Property Prices in Hong Kong 
SAR: Implications for Policy. IMF Working Paper, No. 277. https://doi.
org/10.5089/9781463925949.001
41. Johannesson-Linden, A. and Gayer, C., 2012. Possible reforms of real estate 
taxation: Criteria for successful policies. European Economy, Occasional 
Papers, No. 119.
42. Koetter, M., Marek, P. and Mavropoulos, A., 2019. Housing Demand and 
Credit Supply: Evidence from the German Real Estate Transaction Tax. 
Mimeo.
43. Kuttner, K. N. and Shim, I., 2013. Can non-interest rate policies stabilize 
housing markets? Evidence from a panel of 57 economies. Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements Working Paper, No. 433. https://doi.org/10.3386/w19723
44. Lenoel, C., Matsu, J. and Naisbitt, B., 2018. International evidence review on 
housing taxation. CaCHE Working Paper, No. R2018_02_03. 
45. Martin, H. and Hanson, A., 2016. Metropolitan area home prices and the mort-
gage interest deduction: estimates and simulations from policy change. 









































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
502 46. Matsaganis, M. and Flevotomou, M., 2007. The impact of mortgage interest 
tax relief in the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Italy and Greece. EUROMOD 
Working Paper Series, No. EM2/07.
47. Mirrlees, J. [et al.], 2011. Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2011.00140.x
48. Norregaard, M. J., 2013. Taxing immovable property revenue potential and 
implementation challenges. IMF Working Paper, No. 129. https://doi.
org/10.5089/9781484369050.001
49. Oates, W. E. and Fischel, W. A., 2016. Are local property taxes regressive, 
progressive, or what? National Tax Journal, 69(2), pp. 415-434. https://doi.
org/10.17310/ntj.2016.2.06
50. Oates, W. E. and Schwab, R. M., 2004. What should local governments tax: 
income or property? City taxes, city spending, pp. 7–29. https://doi.
org/10.4337/9781845421632.00009
51. Oliviero, T. [et al.], 2019. House prices and immovable property tax: Evidence 
from OECD countries. Metroeconomica, 70(4), pp. 776–792. https://doi.
org/10.1111/meca.12253
52. Poterba, J. M. and Sinai, T. M., 2008. Tax expenditures for owner-occupied 
housing: deductions for property taxes and mortgage interest and the exclu-
sion of imputed rental income. American Economic Review, 98(2), pp. 84–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.84
53. Poterba, J. M. and Sinai, T. M., 2011. Revenue costs and incentive effects of 
mortgage interest deduction for owner-occupied housing. National Tax Jour-
nal, 64, pp. 531–564. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2011.2s.05
54. Poterba, J. M., 1984.  Tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing: an asset-
market approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, pp. 729–752. https://
doi.org/10.2307/1883123
55. Poterba, J. M., 1992. Taxation and housing: old questions, new answers. 
American Economic Review, 82(2), pp. 237–242. https://doi.org/10.3386/
w3963
56. Rosen, H. S., 1979. Housing Decisions and the US Income Tax: An Econo-
metric Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 11(1), pp. 1–23. 
57. Rosen, H. S. and Rosen, K. T., 1980. Federal Taxes and Homeownership: 
Evidence from Time Series. Journal of Political Economy, 88(1), pp. 59–75. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/260847
58. Rosen, H. S., 1985. Housing subsidies: effects on housing decisions, effi-
ciency, and equity. In: M. Feldstein and A. Auerbach (eds). Handbook of Pub-
lic Economics, vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.3386/
w1161
59. Saarimaa, T., 2011. Imputed rental income, taxation and income distribu-









































































44 (4) 483-504 (2020)
50360. Slack, E. and Bird, R. M., 2014. The political economy of property tax reform. 
OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism, No. 18. https://doi.
org/10.1787/5jz5pzvzv6r7-en
61. Slack, E. and Bird, R. M., 2015. How to reform the property tax: lessons from 
around the world. IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance, No. 
21. 
62. Smart, M. 2013. The Reform of Business Property Tax in Ontario: An Evalu-
ation. IMFG Papers 10. University of Toronto, Institute on Municipal Finance 
and Governance.
63. Song, Y. and Zenou, Y., 2006. Property Tax and Urban Sprawl: Theory and 
Implications for US Cities. Journal of Urban Economics, 60(3), pp. 519–534. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2006.05.001
64. TEDB, 2020. Taxes in Europe Database.
65. Van Ommeren, J. and Leuvensteijn, M. V., 2005. New evidence of the effect 
of transaction costs on residential mobility. Journal of regional science, 45(4), 
pp. 681–702. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4146.2005.00389.x
66. Voith, R., 1999. Does the U.S. Tax Treatment of Housing Create an Incentive 
for Exclusionary Zoning and Increased Decentralization? Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, No. 99–22. https://doi.org/10.21799/
frbp.wp.1999.22
67. Wassmer, R. W., Fisher, R. C. and Kuloszewski, Z., 2019. Perspectives of the 
Property Tax Forty Years after Proposition 13. https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3434005
68. Xhignesse, G. and Verbist, G., 2019. An assessment of the spatial efficiency of 
tax benefits for home mortgages in Belgium. Housing Studies, pp. 1–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2018.1562057
